Science-Based Business : Knowledge Capital or Entrepreneurial Ability? : Theory and Evidence from a Survey of Biotechnology Start-ups by Braguinsky, Serguey et al.
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
Science-Based Business : Knowledge Capital or
Entrepreneurial Ability? : Theory and Evidence from
a Survey of Biotechnology Start-ups
Author(s)






























































Institute of Innovation Research
Hitotsubashi University
Tokyo, Japan
http://www.iir.hit-u.ac.jpScience-Based Business: Knowledge Capital or Entrepreneurial Ability? 
Theory and Evidence from a Survey of Biotechnology Start-ups 
Serguey Braguinsky, Yuji Honjo, Sadao Nagaoka, and Kenta Nakamura
* 
Abstract 
We present a model of science-based entrepreneurship where ideas initially produced by 
researchers  with  high-level  knowledge  capital  may  be  developed  by  high-ability 
entrepreneurs.    With  moderate  investment  costs,  startups  continuously  managed  by 
inventors-founders  coexist  in  equilibrium  with  startups  that  experience  entrepreneurial 
turnover.    The model predicts that startups managed by non-founder entrepreneurs would 
on average outperform the startups managed by their founders and that better functioning of 
the  market  for  entrepreneurial  talent  should  result  in  more  entrepreneurial  turnover  in 
equilibrium which in its turn leads to more ideas being commercialized and higher rewards 
to successful startups.    The predictions of the model are tested against a unique dataset 
drawing upon a representative sample of biotechnology startups in Japan and are found to 
be broadly supported in the data. 
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The  nature  of  entrepreneurship  in  industries  that  place  particularly  strong  demand  on 
highest-level  knowledge  and  human  capital  has  been  examined  in  several  recent 
contributions  (Bhidé  [2000],  Zingales  [2000],  Kaplan,  Sensoy,  and  Stromberg  [2009], 
Braguinsky,  Klepper,  and  Ohyama  [2010]).    Biotechnology  industry  has  attracted 
particular attention as a primary example of such “science-based” industry (e.g., Zucker et 
al. [1998]).    It has been argued that the role of human capital as a “critical resource” in 
such  industries  changes  the  very  essence  of  how  economists  define  firms  and  their 
interaction with markets, and also requires the introduction of radically new management 
concepts (Zingales [2000], Pisano [2010]).    Other studies, however, have found that more 
“traditional” theories of the firm actually mesh surprisingly well with evidence from such 
high-tech, science-based industries (Kaplan et al. [2009]). 
  In this paper, we present a simple theory of science-based entrepreneurship, to 
deepen our understanding of the factors of entrepreneurial success in industries such as the 
biotechnology industry.    We then empirically probe some of the predictions of the theory 
by using a hand-collected data set on biotechnology start-ups in Japan. 
  In our theory, the input from basic research is a “critical resource” in the sense 
that an innovative startup is not possible without it.      There is another critical resource, 
however, which we call “entrepreneurial ability” but which could be interpreted broadly as 
including knowledge of the market and experience of doing business in a given industry.     3 
This resource has repeatedly been found to be the most important predictor of success in 
high-tech industries of the past (e.g., Klepper [2002]) and we conjecture that in this sense, 
science-based business is no different.    The expected value of a startup is thus a product of 
two factors, the input from the basic research and the input in the form of entrepreneurial 
ability. 
  In  the  model,  startup  founders  are  endowed  with  seeds  coming  from  basic 
research, the commercial values of which are not known.    Founders are heterogeneous in 
entrepreneurial ability and those of them with low ability may hire those with high ability 
to develop their seeds.    A founder either retains the seed for the future at no investment 
cost, or he invests to learn the value of the seed.    In the latter case, if the seed turns out to 
be no good, a high-ability founder becomes a “seedless” entrepreneur who may move to 
another startup to develop a good seed. 
  The  implications  of  the  model  shed  light  on  several  characteristics  of 
science-based  business  that  featured  prominently  in  past  studies.    First,  the  model 
highlights the crucial role played by the “market for ideas” (see Gans, Hsu, and Stern 
[2002]).    Without  such  a  market,  which  we  model  as  the  market  where  talented 
entrepreneurs are matched with commercially promising seeds, the cost of investing to 
learn the quality of the seed can easily become prohibitive even for seed owners with the 
highest entrepreneurial ability, leading to an equilibrium characterized by sluggish growth 
and “dormant seeds” that never get a chance to be evaluated.    Second, the model implies   4 
that lowering investment costs results in fuller transfer of seeds from basic researchers to 
high-ability entrepreneurs as they reach the potential commercialization stage, which in 
turn leads to an equilibrium with fast selection of seeds to be either developed or discarded, 
and higher expected payoffs, in line with the model in Aghion, Dewatripoint and Stein 
[2008].    Third,  in  equilibrium  with  moderately  high  investment  costs,  there  will  be 
startups continuously managed by original inventors alongside startups that experience a 
change in management.    Furthermore, the model predicts that high levels of investment 
and  better  development  of  seeds  will  be  primarily  associated  with  the  startups  that 
experience a change in management. 
We probe the predictions of the model using a unique hand-collected dataset on 
the  Japanese  biotechnology  industry.    While  the  United  States  remains  the  undisputed 
leader in this area, since the late 1990s Japan has adopted a wide range of regulatory, 
financial and other measures to spur the growth of the domestic biotechnology industry 
(Honjo et al. [2009]).    Partly as a result of that, the number of biotech firms in Japan had 
increased from 116 to 586 from 1994-2006 (Motohashi [2007], p. 2), making the Japanese 
biotechnology industry the second largest in the world after the U.S. in terms of sheer 
number of firms.    Japan continues to lag behind the U.S., however, in the number of IPOs 
(around 20 IPOs as of 2006 compared to 330 in the U.S.) and the volume of sales (barely 
over 10 percent of the U.S. level; see Motohashi [2007]). 
Our theory implies that in order to catch up with the U.S. not just in quantity but   5 
also in the quality of startups, Japan needs to create conditions under which more seeds are 
transferred to specialized entrepreneurs.    In line with the theory, we find high-investing 
and faster-growing startups, as well as startups that successfully conducted IPOs tend to be 
those that had experienced entrepreneurial turnover at some point after they were founded. 
Our paper has important management and policy implications.    To the best of 
our  knowledge  this  is  one  of  the  first  studies  to  demonstrate,  both  theoretically  and 
empirically using a relatively large and representative sample of startups the importance of 
having specialized entrepreneurs develop and commercialize seeds produced from basic 
research.    High-level specific human capital may be important at the inception but it is 
relegated to a supporting role when it comes to developing a commercially viable product.   
Startups in countries where the market for entrepreneurial talent is not yet as developed as 
it is in the U.S. (such as Japan), may also benefit from international cooperation.    In terms 
of policy, our findings suggest that the Japanese government should try not so much to 
emulate  the  early  development  stage  of  the  U.S.  biotechnology  industry  by  supporting 
university-based businesses operating in local business communities, but instead should 
concentrate its resources on developing nation-wide market for entrepreneurial talent. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.    In the next section we briefly 
discuss past research.    No attempt is made to survey the fast-growing literature on the 
biotechnology industry as a whole; instead, we focus on studies, where we think our paper 
can  contribute  some  new  theoretical  insights  or  interpretations  of  empirical  evidence.     6 
Section 3 presents our model and discusses its implications for markets and startups.    In 
Section  4  we  describe  the  data  and  test  several  predictions  of  the  model  using  these.   
Section 5 concludes and contains further discussion of our findings. 
2. Connection to past research 
Zucker  et  al.  [1998]  examined  the  process  of  entry  and  development  of  the  American 
biotechnology industry and concluded that “the growth and location of intellectual human 
capital was the principal determinant of the growth and location of the industry itself,” with 
the  industry  itself  being  “a  testament  to  the  value  of  basic  research.”  (p.  302)    The 
fundamental  feature  of  the  biotechnology  industry  as  a  science-based  business  and  the 
dramatic impact its emergence has had on commercial activities by universities, such as 
patenting,  licensing  and  investing  in  spinouts  has  been  confirmed    by  numerous 
subsequent studies (see, for example, Jensen and Thursby [2001], Thursby and Thursby 
[2002], Zucker and Darby [2006]). 
Even though there is thus little doubt that specific high-level human capital is of 
crucial importance for a potential biotechnology innovation, it is less certain that the same 
specific human capital remains critical during the process of developing and implementing 
an  innovation.    In  a  careful  study,  Gittelman  and  Kogut  [2003]  find  that  important 
scientific papers written by academic researchers and high-impact innovations are actually 
negatively  correlated.    They  conclude  that  science-based  business  in  general  and  the 
biotechnology  industry  in  particular  need  separate  organizational  entities  (small   7 
research-intensive firms) whose task would be to combine valuable knowledge and to select 
scientific ideas to produce important technical innovations.    Similarly, Gans et al. [2002] 
find that in the biotechnology industry, start-up innovators earn returns not by pursuing 
their businesses independently but by acting as upstream “suppliers” of technology, with an 
important role played by third-party “brokers.” 
  This  theme  has  been  pursued  further  in  the  bulging  literature  on  strategic 
alliances  in  the  biotechnology  industry  (see,  e.g.,  Lerner  and  Merges  [1998],  Baum, 
Calabrese and Silverman [2000], Rothaermel and Deeds [2004], etc.).    In particular, it has 
been found that forming alliances at an early stage (including the exploratory stage) helps 
especially  smaller  startups  (Rothaermel  and  Deeds  [2004]).    Shan,  Walher  and  Kogut 
[1994]  and  Baum,  Calabrese  and  Silverman  [2000]  hypothesized  that  the  relationship 
between alliances and better performance of start-ups can be reciprocal but they only found 
evidence that alliances affect performance positively but not vice versa. 
The nature of entrepreneurship in science-based business and the biotechnology 
industry in particular has been conceptualized in broadly two different ways.    According 
to one approach, “the innovations which underlie biotechnology are properly analyzed in 
terms of naturally excludable knowledge held by a small initial group of discoverers, their 
coworkers, and others who learned the knowledge from working at the bench-science level 
with those possessing the requisite know-how.” (Zucker et al. [1998], p. 291).    Zingales 
[2000] and Rajan and Zingales [2001] argue that because of these features, the traditional   8 
theory of the firm, which associates this concept with strictly hierarchical control over a 
well-defined tangible critical resource may not be applicable to the biotechnology industry.   
Having  high-level  specific  human  capital  as  the  “critical  resource”  may  lead  to 
“deintegrating  the  firm”,  potentially  paralyzing  its  ability  to  function  effectively.    In  a 
similar vein, Pisano [2010] concludes that new organizational forms, beyond the traditional 
concept of a firm and even beyond the concept of traditional venture capital are required to 
meet the challenges of science based-business.     
Kaplan, Sensoy and Stromberg [2009] put these ideas to test using a dataset of 
venture capital-backed startups in biotechnology and other high-tech industries.    They find 
that, contrary to the perception of human capital being all-important, in virtually every firm, 
there was little change in their core line of business from age 2 onward whereas there was 
considerable turnover in the human capital, contradicting the perception that biotechnology 
firms  are  crucially  dependent  on  specific  human  capital.    Notably,  all  their  firms 
experience “dramatic growth in revenue, assets and market value (although they do not 
become profitable).” (Kaplan et al. [2009], p. 77)    Hence, while their conclusion that the 
traditional  theory  of  the  firm  is  still  quite  relevant  even  in  science-based  business  is 
persuasive with regard to the select sample of successful startups, it does not necessarily 
contradict  the  conclusions  in  Zingales  [2000]  which,  almost  by  construction,  apply  to 
somewhat dysfunctional firms.   
A  theory  proposed  by  Aghion,  Dewatripoint  and  Stein  [2008]  hints  at  one   9 
possible way of reconciling the two approaches.    In their model, the initial basic research 
stage of developing a potential high-impact innovation is carried out in academia and may 
be characterized by the lack of focus and self-indulging behavior of scientists, but once the 
idea approaches the commercialization stage, the control over its implementation should be 
given to the private sector and carried out with much greater focus. 
One  crucial  thing  not  modeled  in  Aghion  et  al.  [2008]  is  how  this  turnover 
happens and who selects ideas for innovations.    A different kind of a critical resource is 
all-important at this stage, and this resource is the high-ability entrepreneurs (“brokers” in 
the “market for ideas” as in Gans et al. [2002]).    Such entrepreneurs would normally also 
possess high-level knowledge in biotechnology but they are not necessarily star scientists 
while their biggest asset is the knowledge of the market that comes from experience in the 
industry  or  in  venture  capital.    In  the  next  section  we  construct  a  simple  model  that 
captures  the  essence  of  this  story  and  derive  some  implications  about  the  nature  of 
innovation in the biotechnology industry that will then be tested against the data. 
3. The model 
We exploit two features inherent in the nature of science-based business.    First, startups 
are based on a seed developed through scientific research and startup founders must possess 
a  high-level  specialized  knowledge  in  science.    Second,  failure  rates  are  high  because 
many seeds that look promising initially turn out to be commercially not viable.    Thus, 
even  startups  established  by  founders  with  high  entrepreneurial  ability  often  find   10 
themselves lacking a good project (seed) after failing to develop their original idea into a 
commercial product.    The key assumption (which finds support in evidence, including the 
evidence from Japan presented below) is that such a “seedless” entrepreneur can under 
certain circumstances put his talent to work with a seed invented by someone else.    This 
“recycling” of entrepreneurial talent requires a functioning “market for ideas” (or market 
for entrepreneurial talent, as the case might be) but it has the potential to dramatically 
change the nature of the game in science-based business. 
  The  crucial  role  is  played  by  investment  costs  involved  in  evaluating  and 
pursuing the development of a seed.    If such investment costs are high (which may be the 
result of poor protection of property rights in the market for ideas – see Gans et al. [2002], 
or of poor development of capital markets), few or even no seeds will be transferred to 
high-ability entrepreneurs in equilibrium, resulting in sluggish development and low values 
of startups.    In contrast, in markets with low investment costs, all seeds get evaluated fast 
and  good  seeds  are  developed  by  high-ability  entrepreneurs  leading  to  high  values  of 
startups.    We develop a stylized model that formalizes these ideas.    Longer proofs are in 
the appendix. 
3.1 The set-up 
We generalize and adapt the model in Jovanovic and Braguinsky [2004].    At the outset 
startups differ in the entrepreneurial ability, x, of their founders.    Each startup is endowed 
with a seed, and the quality of the seeds, z, differs over startups.    Some startup founders   11 
with high entrepreneurial ability may find themselves with useless seeds and vice versa.   
The  market  for  entrepreneurs  then  serves  to  re-deploy  high-ability  entrepreneurs  from 
useless seeds to good seeds.    A startup’s value is xz.    Thus the quality of the seed, z, and 
the entrepreneur’s ability to develop it, x, are complements. 
  Among  startups,  x  ≥  0  is  distributed  according  to  the  cumulative  distribution 
function F(x).    Seeds are either good or useless:  .    A fraction λ of seeds is good, 
and the fraction 
€ 
1− λ  is useless; also, we assume for simplicity that λ does not depend on 
x, so all startups are equally likely to have a good seed. 
  We assume that entrepreneurial ability x is known.    Evaluating and developing a 
seed is a full-time activity, so that an entrepreneur can handle only one seed at a time.    A 
startup founder has two options: (i) retain the seed for possible future development at no 
cost (hereafter “no-investment option”), or (ii) invest C > 0 to learn and certify the quality 
of the seed (hereafter “investment option”).    All startups are risk-neutral and maximize the 
discounted expected value, with the reservation value of exit normalized to zero. 
Startups cannot change seeds.
1  They can, however, hire entrepreneurs to develop 
certified good seeds.    If a startup founder hires an entrepreneur with ability x’, the startup 
uses its own seed, z, and the entrepreneurial ability of the entrepreneur it has hired, x’.   
The value of such a startup will thus be x’z.    To the seed owner who hires an entrepreneur, 
                                            
1  This assumption is made to concentrate on turnover of managerial talent, which is our focus here, but it is 
not essential for the properties of the equilibrium below.    This is discussed further in the concluding section.   12 
then, only the ability of the hired entrepreneur matters, while for the hired entrepreneur all 
potential employers with good seeds have the same value (z = 1).    A competitive market 
then ensures that entrepreneurs receive compensation commensurate with their marginal 
contribution (ability x) while seed owners who hire them receive the same compensation q. 
  Events occur in four stages: 
1.  A continuum of startups forms. 
2.  Startups choose whether to incur the investment cost C to learn the quality of the 
seed or to hold on to the seed of unknown quality under the “no-investment option”.   
The startups that paid C observe the quality of the seed z.    Those with z = 1 choose 
whether  to  develop  the  seed  on  their  own  or  hire  a  “seedless”  entrepreneur  to 
develop the seed.    Those with z = 0 become “seedless” entrepreneurs that may be 
hired to develop seeds owned by startups with z = 1. 
3.  The market for entrepreneurs clears with owners of good seeds who hire others to 
develop their seeds receiving q and seedless entrepreneurs with ability x receiving x 
– q.    This market is Walrasian in that startups take prices as given and there are no 
out-of-equilibrium transactions. 
4.  Startups with certified good seeds (z = 1) proceed to the development stage. 
3.2 Expected values 
If a startup chooses the no-investment option (i) it retains the ownership of the seed and 
will privately observe its quality at some future date, at which point it will decide whether   13 
to pursue the seed’s development or exit the industry.    We assume that without incurring 
investment cost C a startup cannot certify the quality of its seed, so it will not be able to 
hire another manager.    Hence, the expected value of such a startup is given by 
  ,            (1) 
where 
€ 
β  is the discount factor. 
If a startup chooses the investment option (ii), there are two possible cases.    In 
the first case a founder invests C to learn and certify the quality of the seed in anticipation 
that he will hire a seedless entrepreneur to develop the seed if z = 1.    It is shown later that 
such founders are never hired to develop other startups’ seeds in equilibrium so that they 
receive compensation q if and only if z = 1.    Thus the expected private value of the startup 
for a founder in this case is   
€ 
EI1 = λq−C.            (2) 
Now  consider  a  founder  who  chooses  the  investment  option  with  a  view  to 
developing a good seed on his own, while also expecting to be hired to develop a good seed 
owned by someone else if his own seed turns out to be useless.    Again, we show later that 
these  expectations  are  fulfilled  in  equilibrium.    Hence,  such  entrepreneurs’  expected 
private values are given by 
€ 
EI 2 = λx −C + 1− λ ( ) x −q ( ) = x −C − 1− λ ( )q.      (3) 
3.2 The no-investment equilibrium 
Let the support of x be given by 
€ 
0,xmax [ ], where xmax is finite.    We have:   14 
Proposition 1. If the investment costs are very high, specifically, if 
€ 
C ≥ λ 1−βλ ( )xmax,            (4) 
no startup chooses the investment option and no entrepreneurs develop others’ seeds.    In 
this case, R&D investment levels and startup value are low, and seeds are evaluated and 
developed slowly, with relatively low payoffs even for good seeds. 
Proof:    The expected value of a startup founder who chooses the investment option and 
expects to hire an entrepreneur to develop the seed in case z = 1 has to be non-negative in 
(2), implying that 
€ 
q ≥ C λ.    The expected value of a startup founder who chooses the 
investment option and expects to be hired to develop a good seed in case z = 0 is given by 
(3).    It  is  easy  to  see  that  under  condition  (4)  it  will  be  less  than  ENI  in  (1)  for  the 
entrepreneur with the highest x even if the transfer price 
€ 
q = C λ.    Hence, no inventor 
chooses  the  investment  option,  rendering  the  transfer  of  seeds  to  more  capable 
entrepreneurs impossible.    The remaining claims follow immediately. 
3.3 Equilibrium with the investment option and entrepreneurial turnover 
Assume now that investment costs are not prohibitively high, so that 
€ 
C < λ 1−βλ ( )xmax,            (5) 
Then  there  exists  an  equilibrium  in  which  some  or  possibly  all  startups  exercise  the 
investment option, and seedless entrepreneurs with high x are hired to manage good seeds 
by startup founders with low x.    We illustrate one such equilibrium (in which some but not 
all startups exercise the investment option) in Figure 1, and describe it below.   15 
  [Figure 1 around here] 
The  key  feature  of  the  equilibrium  are  two  real  numbers, 
€ 
ˆ  x   and  .    These 
numbers divide the set of x-values into at most three regions – top, middle and bottom. 
Startups that invest C to learn and certify z and hire seedless entrepreneurs to develop their 
seeds if z = 1 come from the bottom region, while startups that invest C and either develop 
their seeds if z = 1 or are hired to develop good seeds for the startups from the bottom 
region if z = 0 come from the top region.    Startups from the middle region (which might 
be empty as shown below) choose the no-investment option and hold on to their seeds.   
We start describing the equilibrium with an account of Stage-2 actions and Stage-3 private 
values of startups in each region. 
The Bottom Region: 
€ 
x ≤ ˜  x , where    is the lower bound of the middle region in case 
the latter is non-empty, 
€ 
x ≤ ˆ  x , where 
€ 
ˆ  x   is the lower bound of the top region otherwise --- 
Startup founders in this region pay C and certify the quality of the seed z.    If z = 1, they 
hire an entrepreneur from the top region and all receive the same transfer price q.    If 
, founder    is indifferent between receiving q with probability 
€ 
λ, on the one hand, 
and choosing the no-investment option with the expected value  , on the other hand: 
€ 
βλ˜  x = λq−C.            (6) 
If    so  that  the  middle  range  in  empty,  the  founder 
€ 
ˆ  x   is  indifferent  between 
receiving q with probability 
€ 
λ, on the one hand, and developing his own seed in case z = 1 
or being hired to develop someone else’s seed in case z = 0, on the other hand:   16 
 
€ 
λq−C = ˆ  x −C − 1− λ ( )q, 
or 
€ 
ˆ  x = q.              (7) 
The Middle Region: 
€ 
x ∈ ˜  x  , ˆ  x  ( )  if  , empty otherwise --- Startup founders in this 
region choose the no-investment option.    Intuitively, startups in this region have too good 
management to be willing to pay for development by another entrepreneur, but are not good 
enough to choose the investment option. 
The Top Region: 
€ 
x ≥ ˆ  x   --- Startup founders in this region pay C and learn the quality 
of  the  seed  z.    If  z  =  1,  they  proceed  to  develop  it.    If  z  =  0,  they  become  seedless 
entrepreneurs and sell their services to startups in the first region.    If  , founder 
€ 
ˆ  x   is 
indifferent between the expected value of this option given by (3) and the expected value of 
the no-investment option (1): 
€ 
βλˆ  x = ˆ  x −C − 1− λ ( )q,          (8) 
If on the other hand,    so that the middle range in empty, 
€ 
ˆ  x   is indifferent 
between developing someone else’s good seed and exiting, that is, we once again have 
  
€ 
ˆ  x = q.              (7) 
Demand = Supply. --- Demand for entrepreneurs must equal their supply:   
  .        (9) 
Proposition 2. If condition (5) holds, the investment option and entrepreneurial turnover 
occur in equilibrium.    Furthermore, 
•  Either    where   17 
€ 
ˆ  x =
1− λ ( )β
1−βλ
˜  x +
C
λ 1−βλ ( )
          (10)   
and 
€ 










 = 1− λ ( )1− F













 ,      (11) 
•  Or    and 
€ 
q ≥ C λ 1−β ( )  solves 
€ 
λF q ( ) = 1− λ ( ) 1− F q ( ) [ ].          (12) 
In the latter case the no-investment option does not occur in equilibrium. 
Proof: see appendix. 
Figure 2 present a numerical example of the equilibrium of the first type (with non-emtpy 
middle region, hence, with no-investment option as part of equilibrium behavior).    Figure 
3  present  a  numerical  example  of  the  equilibrium  of  the  second  type,  where  the 
no-investment  option  is  dominated  by  the  investment  option  and  subsequent  hiring  of 
seedless entrepreneurs from the top region by founders in the bottom region. 
  [Figures 2 and 3 around here] 
Comparative Statics – The comparative statics of the model are given by the 
following 
Proposition  3.    Other  things  equal,  more  seeds  will  be  certified  and  transferred  to 
high-ability entrepreneurs in equilibrium if investment costs C and the discount factor   
are low, but the effect of the increase in the fraction of good seeds    is ambiguous. 
Proof: see appendix.   18 
Investment costs C are likely to be lower if property rights for ideas are well 
defined, and if there is an abundant supply of venture capital (e.g., Gans et al. [2002]). Our 
model suggests a caveat, however.    One interpretation of the discount factor 
€ 
β  is that 
“slow” approach taken by a startup can result in losing the seed because patent rights of the 
inventor  may  expire  or  be  successfully  challenged  in  court  (such  cases  were  indeed 
confirmed  in  our  interviews  with  Japanese  university  startups  as  documented  below).   
Hence, to increase the transfer of good seeds to high-ability entrepreneurs, property rights 
to ideas should be strong but at the same time short-lived, rendering unprofitable the option 
of holding on to the seed by founders of low entrepreneurial ability. 
  Even  though  the  effect  of  a  higher  fraction  of  good  seeds    is  theoretically 
ambiguous, numerical simulations show that for reasonable parameter values it also leads 
to more good seeds being transferred in equilibrium (details are available upon request).   
Increased supply of better-quality (that is, more commercializable) seeds can be expected to 
come from increased willingness of universities and basic research institutions in general to 
license  their  innovations  and  place  more  emphasis  on  the  ties  between  university  and 
industry research, the pattern that has also been well-documented in studies on recent trends 
in university entrepreneurship (e.g., Thursby and Thursby [2002]; Shane [2002]). 
3.4 Testable predictions 
We concentrate on the equilibrium that includes but is not limited to the no-investment 
option and summarize empirical predictions that are then tested against the data.   19 
Note first that improving the conditions for entrepreneurial talent to be “recycled” 
should result in more startups, especially by scientists and those formerly employed in 
academia with potentially commercializable seeds from basic research.    This prediction, 
of  course,  is  not  surprising  and  is  not  particularly  specific  to  our  model.    A  more 
discriminating prediction is that as the number of startups founded around basic research 
ideas increase, more of those startups will use specialized entrepreneurial talent coming 
from non-academia to develop their ideas.    Hence, the model predicts that the increase in 
the number of startups founded by academic researchers will tend to happen together with 
the  decrease  in  the  number  of  startups  still  managed  by  academic  researchers  after 
experiencing management turnover.    We thus have: 
EP1. Better functioning of the market for entrepreneurial talent and lower investment costs 
(such as the introduction of the equivalent of the Bayh-Dole act) should result in more 
startups created with core technology coming from basic research and founded by former 
scientists and academia employees.    At the same time, startups experiencing changes in 
management  will  tend  to  be  managed  less  by  academic  researchers  and  more  by 
entrepreneurs with prior experience in the industry. 
We now turn to the predictions of the model regarding startups that experience 
entrepreneurial turnover versus those that don’t.    The model predicts that startups that do 
not change management will be comprised of two subgroups.    The first such subgroup 
will consist of startups managed by founders with entrepreneurial ability in the middle   20 
range, choosing the no-investment option and neither learning the quality nor developing 
their  seeds.    The  other  subgroup  will  be  startups  managed  by  high-ability 
founder-entrepreneurs that exercised the investment option and learned that z = 1.    If the 
fraction of good seeds 
€ 
λ  is low (as available evidence leads us to expect might be the case 
– see e.g., Pisano [2010]), we can expect the sample of surviving startups in the data that do 
not undergo entrepreneurial turnover to be pretty much dominated by the former subgroup. 
In  contrast,  surviving  startups  that  do  change  managers  in  charge  will  be 
comprised only of those that have a certified good seed.    Hence, a testable prediction of 
the model is that an average startup that subsequently experiences entrepreneurial turnover 
will be more likely to have a certified good seed to be developed at the outset than an 
average startup that does not experience entrepreneurial turnover.    It is natural to expect 
that a startup with a proven commercially viable seed will be able to raise a larger amount 
of start-up capital and will have a larger initial size.    Thus, we have 
EP2. Entrepreneurial turnover should be associated with larger initial capital and larger 
initial size of the startup. 
Also, all startups that experience entrepreneurial turnover will be managed by 
entrepreneurs in the top part of the ability distribution and will have their seeds being 
developed, while only a (relatively small) fraction of those that do not experience such 
turnover  will  be  so.    Hence,  an  average  startup  that  does  experience  entrepreneurial 
turnover will be more likely than its counterpart that does not experience such turnover to   21 
pursue an active R&D program and to generate higher shareholders’ value.    The latter will 
be reflected in higher amounts of raised capital and larger firm size.    Higher shareholders’ 
value will also tend to be manifested in IPO events.    Thus, 
EP3. Entrepreneurial turnover should be associated with higher R&D investment, larger 
amounts of raised capital, larger size of the firm, and higher probabilities of IPO. 
  In the model, the startups with z = 1 founded by entrepreneurs in the low part of the 
ability distribution immediately hire high-ability entrepreneurs to develop the seed.    In 
reality the process of finding a suitable entrepreneur can take some time.    If the startup is 
only able to start moving with developing its seed after a high-ability entrepreneur has been 
hired, the time that elapses between entry and the time the startup hires a new high-ability 
entrepreneur to develop its seed will not affect the flow of R&D investment, but it will 
affect  the  amount  of  capital  raised  and  the  startup’s  size  because  these  increase  only 
gradually as the startup moves through the seed development stage.    Hence, we have one 
more, rather discriminating prediction of our model: 
EP4. The positive effect of entrepreneurial turnover on the amount of raised capital and 
startup  size  will  be  an  increasing  function  of  the  new  entrepreneur’s  tenure  after 
controlling for the startup age.    The positive effect on R&D expenditure, however, will be 
independent of the new entrepreneur’s tenure.   22 
4. Testing the model: entry and growth in the Japanese biotechnology industry 
4.1 The data 
The data come from two surveys of firms in the Japanese biotechnology industry conducted 
by Japan Bioindustry Association (JBA) with the support of the Hitotsubashi University 
Institution of Innovation Research (IIR) for the questionnaire designs in 2008 and 2009.   
JBA is a non-profit organization dedicated to the promotion of the Japanese biotechnology 
industry.    In order to obtain information on new ventures in the biotechnology industry, 
the so-called “bio-ventures,” JBA has been constructing the list of firms and conducting a 
simple yearly questionnaire survey since 2002. 
  The extended questionnaires designed jointly by JBA and IIR was sent out to 770 
firms and 716 firms in 2008 and 2009 surveys, respectively.    In order to be included into 
surveys, firms had to satisfy two criteria: (1) they had to be operating in the biotechnology 
industry as classified by the Japanese Industrial Standard (JIS) classification, and (2) they 
had to be small or medium enterprises under the Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law 
of Japan (300 or fewer regular employees or capital stock of no more than 300 million yen 
– about $3 million).    Firms that did not meet either of these criteria were excluded from 
the surveys.    The numbers of effective responses was 309 in both years, with response 
rates of 40 and 43 percent for 2008 and 2009, respectively.    We further excluded from 
analyses  some  special  types  of  firms,  such  as  firms  conducting  solely  export-import 
operations and non-profit organizations established solely for R&D purposes.    As a result,   23 
the final sample is composed of 292 firms (2008 survey) and 281 firms (2009 survey). 
  The respondents were asked to provide information about the year the firm was 
founded as well as the year in which it entered the biotechnology industry.    Only about 7 
percent  of  the  firms  reported  that  they  had  been  founded  prior  to  entry  into  the 
biotechnology industry, so that 93 percent of the sample consists of de novo startups.    A 
lion’s share of firms (88 percent) were founded after 1990, and more than 70 percent of the 
sample  were  founded  in  2000  or  later,  presumably  because  several  policies  for  the 
promotion of new ventures, such as tax reform for business angels and the setup of the 
technological license office (TLO), accompanied by the introduction of its equivalent of the 
Bayh-Dole Act were introduced in Japan in the late 1990s. 
  The questionnaires also asked whether the startup was managed by its founder at 
the time of the survey or if there had been a change of the CEO.    In the latter case, the 
respondents were also asked to report how many years the current CEO had been in charge.   
Other questions requested information about the seed technology at the time of the startup 
and  the  current  seed  technology  (if  different  from  the  startup  technology),  R&D 
expenditure, the amount of capital and the number of employees at the time the firm was 
founded and at the date of the survey, whether the firm had received venture capital funding, 
whether it had patents granted or applied for in Japan and in the United States and whether 
it  had  successfully  conducted  or  planned  to  conduct  IPO  in  the  near  future  (this  latter 
question was asked in the 2008 survey only).    The variables derived from these responses   24 
are used to test the model below. 
  The  data  also  contain  information  about  the  area  of  the  main  activity  of  the 
startup.    Slightly less than two thirds of the startups in the sample reported that their main 
area of R&D activity was the development of new medical products (including developing 
new drugs), the rest were conducting most activity in bioengineering, environment and new 
energy resources and so on.    Detailed information about the current CEO’s background 
(such as education, age, and prior work experience) was also provided, and we use these as 
controls where appropriate. 
  Arguably the biggest advantage of our data is that the sample is not limited to 
successful startups (such as VC-backed startups or startups that had already conducted IPO).   
Just slightly over 27 percent of the startups in our sample report having received financing 
from venture capital and less than 10 percent had conducted IPO or at least had specific 
plans to conduct IPO at the time of the surveys.    In contrast, almost half of the respondents 
reported having applied for or being granted patents in the United States and 70 percent had 
patents  applied  for  or  granted  in  Japan.    There  is  also  large  variation  in  market 
capitalization, R&D expenditure and the number of employees.    The data thus present us 
with a unique opportunity to test the predictions of our theory on a relatively large and 
reasonably representative sample of biotechnology startups.    Table 1 presents the basic 
summary statistics for the sample.   25 
4.2 Entry cohorts and types of entrepreneurs 
We examine how empirical predictions of our theory in Section 3 hold against the data.    In 
Table 2 we present evidence on the evolution of types of startups by four entry cohorts: 
prior  to  1990,  1990-1999,  2000-2004,  and  2005-2009.    As  Japan  introduced  measures 
aimed at improving conditions for science-based startups, EP1 predicts that the number of 
such startups should increase but those firms that experience management turnover should 
be managed more by entrepreneurs with non-academic background. 
  The data in Table 2 provide strong support for these predictions.    The sample of 
all startups is divided into those managed by their founders at the time of the survey and 
those managed by non-founder entrepreneurs at the time they were surveyed.    The data 
show that both categories equally experienced a strong increase in the fraction of startups 
whose  core  technologies  draw  on  basic  research  (developed  at  universities  or  public 
research corporations).    Paralleling this, among the startups managed by their founders the 
fractions  of  those  founded  by  former  scientists  and  individuals  formerly  employed  in 
academia increased dramatically (from less than 27 percent to more than 57 percent in the 
former category, and from 6 percent to 37 percent in the latter category). 
But among the startups already managed by non-founders, the fractions of those 
whose entrepreneurs are former scientists and academic employees actually fell sharply 
throughout the 1990s and the 2000s.    Hence, while policy measures aimed at promoting 
startups based on academic research have resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of   26 
new startups in the biotechnology industry founded by scientists and individuals formerly 
employed in academia, they seem to have also resulted in more frequent replacement of 
former scientists and academics by specialized entrepreneurs in the startups experiencing 
managerial turnover. 
4.3 Turnover of entrepreneurs and startup size at the time of founding 
We now turn to testing the predictions of the theory related to the effects of entrepreneurial 
turnover.    We  predict  that  startups  experiencing  entrepreneurial  turnover  should  have 
proven good seeds at inception, which will be manifested in higher initial amounts of raised 




log_FS0i =α + β1ETi + γXi +εi,        (13) 
where 
€ 
log_FS0i  is the natural log of startup i’s size in the year it was founded, measured 
by either paid capital or the number of employees in actual estimations below, ETi is the 
dummy equal to 1 if the startup was managed by a non-founder CEO at survey date and 
zero otherwise, and Xi is a vector of controls.    Since the amount of initial capital (and 
possibly also the initial number of employees) will be strongly affected by the timing of 
entry, we include 48 founding year dummies in the vector of controls Xi and also seven 
dummies corresponding to different areas of activity of the startup. 
The baseline specification contains only the above controls, and the results are 
presented in the first and third columns of Table 3 (with log initial paid capital and log   27 
initial  number  of  employees  as  the  dependent  variables,  respectively).    The  main 
prediction of our theory is that the coefficient 
€ 
β1  should be positive and significant (EP2), 
and this prediction is very strongly supported.    The estimates indicate that startups that 
experience subsequent entrepreneurial turnover have initial paid capital more than twice as 
large as startups that don’t experience such a turnover (exp(0.719)-1), and have 46 percent 
more employees (exp(0.381)-1).    As expected, entry year dummies are jointly very highly 
significant  (F-statistic  =  51.66  with  log  initial  capital  as  the  dependent  variable  and 
F-statistic = 18.17 with log initial number of employees as the dependent variable) but 
areas  in  which  startups  conduct  their  primary  activity  are  jointly  not  significant  at 
conventional levels in either regression. 
We then add more controls for firm, technology and the current CEO background, 
and  what  may  be  thought  of  as  the  intrinsic  quality  of  the  seed.    To  control  for  firm 
background we use the dummy equal to one if the startup was founded before it entered the 
biotechnology industry (hence, was a diversifying entrant) and zero otherwise, the dummy 
equal to 1 if the core seed technology at the time of entry into biotechnology came from 
basic  research  and  zero  otherwise.    To  control  for  CEO  background,  we  include  two 
dummies, one equal to 1 if his previous job was in scientific research and 0 otherwise, and 
the other equal to 1 if CEO’s previous job was that of a top manager and 0 otherwise (the 
basis for comparison are CEOs whose pre-startup jobs were in other commercial activities, 
such as sales, marketing, accounting and so on).    We further distinguish between CEOs   28 
who were previously employed in academia and in large corporations (with the basis for 
comparison  being  small  and  medium-size  firms  and  financial  institutions)  and  we  also 
include in the vector Xi age, minus tenure in the startup as a proxy for prior labor market 
experience  and  the  dummies  capturing  the  CEO’s  educational  attainment  (one  dummy 
equal to 1 if the founder has a Ph.D. in science and engineering and 0 otherwise, and the 
other equal to 1 if the founder has B.A. or M.S in science and engineering and 0 otherwise).  
Finally, to control for the intrinsic quality of the seed we also include the dummy equal to 1 
if the startup has applied for or was granted a patent in the U.S. and 0 otherwise. 
The results of estimating regression (13) in these specifications with log of initial 
paid capital and the log of the initial number of employees as the dependent variables are 
presented in the second and fourth columns of Table 3, respectively.    Including all these 
extra  controls  has  little  effect  on 
€ 
β1:  entrepreneurial  turnover  is  still  estimated  to  be 
associated with 88 percent increase in initial capital and with 50 percent more employees at 
the time of founding, still statistically significant at 1 percent level.    Among the controls, 
core technology coming from basic research (that is, developed in a university or a public 
research corporation) has a negative effect on initial capital, while patenting activity in the 
US, as expected, has a strong positive impact on both initial paid and initial number of 
employees.    The variables capturing CEO’s background and education, on the other hand, 
are jointly not statistically significant and the areas in which startups conduct their primary 
activity also remain jointly not significant.   29 
4.4 Turnover of entrepreneurs and R&D expenditure 
The  prediction  of  the  model  is  that  entrepreneurial  turnover  should  be  associated  with 
higher R&D expenditure (EP3) and that, moreover, this effect should be independent of the 
number of years the new entrepreneur had been in charge (EP4).    To test this prediction 
we estimate the following regression: 
 
€ 
log_RDi =α + β1ETi + β2tenurei + β3ET_tenurei + γXi +εi,  (14) 
where log_RDi is the natural log of R&D expenditure by startup i in the year of survey, ETi 
is, once again, the dummy equal to 1 if the startup was managed by a non-founder CEO at 
the date of a survey and 0 otherwise, tenurei is the CEO’s tenure on the job, and ET_tenurei 
is the interaction term between non-founder CEO and tenure.    The main prediction of the 
theory is that the sign of 
€ 
β1  should be positive, while the coefficient 
€ 
β3  should be close 
to zero and should not change the impact of 
€ 
β1. 
  The  results  are  presented  in  Table  4.    In  the  first  two  columns  we  limit  the 
vector of controls to seven dummies corresponding to different R&D activity areas and to 
firm age and its square term.    The coefficient on the dummy capturing entrepreneurial 
turnover is large and statistically significant, although only on 10 percent level, while the 
coefficients  on  CEO  tenure  and  its  interaction  term  with  entrepreneurial  turnover  are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero, as predicted by theory.    When these two variables 
are excluded (in the second column), the magnitude of the coefficient on the non-founder 
CEO  dummy  barely  changes,  but  standard  errors  go  way  down,  making  it  statistically   30 
significant at 1 percent level.    The fit of the regression also improves, so we concentrate 
on the specification that excludes these variables from now on. 
  The magnitude of the coefficient 
€ 
β1  estimated in the second column of Table 4 
indicates  that  entrepreneurial  turnover  is  associated  with  112  percent  (exp(0.750)-1) 
increase  in  R&D  expenditure  by  an  average  startup.
2    Not  surprisingly,  the  areas  of 
activity  in  which  startups  conduct  their  R&D  (coefficients  not  shown)  are  now  jointly 
highly significant (F-statistic = 16.56) and so are firm age and its square term. 
  Estimations  presented  in  the  third  column  of  Table  4  add  more  controls.   
Specifically, vector Xi now includes also our proxy for the quality of the seed (the dummy 
reflecting patenting activity in the US) and all the dummies (not shown) reflecting firm and 
CEO backgrounds, education and experience as in the previous subsection.    None of these 
extra controls are either separately or jointly significant at conventional levels (areas of 
activity dummy remain jointly statistically significant at 1 percent level), and including 
them affects the coefficient on the non-founder CEO dummy only marginally.    It is only 
when  we  also  add  the  control  for  the  startup  size  (which  itself  is  strongly  positively 
associated with entrepreneurial turnover in our theory and in estimations presented in the 
next subsection) in the fourth column that the coefficient on the non-founder CEO dummy 
is reduced in magnitude by about 1/3 and becomes slightly less statistically significant. 
                                            
2  The  difference  looks  even  more  striking  in  raw  data:  startups  that  experienced  entrepreneurial  change 
spend  on  average  4.25  times  more  on  R&D  than  startups  that  did  not  (3,815  million  yen  in  the  former 
category versus 897 million yen in the latter category).   31 
4.5 Turnover of entrepreneurs, firm size, and IPO process 
The model predicts that the amount of capital raised by the firm and its size (measured by 
the number of employees) should be positively associated with entrepreneurial turnover 
(EP3), but only after the new entrepreneur has had enough time to move the startup along 
the development stage (EP4).    To probe this we estimate the following regression: 
 
€ 
log_FSi =α + β1ETi + β2tenurei + β3ET_tenurei + β3STi + γXi +εi,  (15) 
where FSi is the firm size at the time of survey, measured by paid capital or by the number 
of employees, while all other variables are the same as in regression (14) above.    As the 
amount  of  raised  capital  and  possibly  also  the  number  of  employees  will  be  strongly 
influenced by the whole firm history, including the timing of entry, we once again control 
for firm age non-parametrically in regression (15) by including 48 startup founding year 
dummies.    The theoretical prediction is that the coefficient 
€ 
β3  in regression (12) should 
be positive and significant. 
The estimation results in Table 5 show a pattern that is consistent with theory, 
regardless of whether paid capital or the number of employees are used as a measure of 
firm size.    In both cases, the coefficient on the non-founder CEO by itself is statistically 
not significant at conventional levels (it is actually indistinguishable from zero when log 
paid capital is the dependent variable and is negative 0.3 but with comparable standard 
errors when log number of employees is the dependent variable).    The prediction that 
€ 
β3 
should be positive and significant holds in both regressions.    In fact, even the magnitude   32 
of this coefficient is the same, although it is statistically significant only at 10 percent level 
in the regression with log paid capital as the dependent variable (at 5 percent level with log 
number of employees as the dependent variable).    The estimated magnitude implies that 
one extra year of tenure of a new CEO increases paid capital and the number of employees 
by about 11 percent.    Since the median tenure of a non-founder CEO in the sample is 3 
years, while the mean is 4.47 years, we estimate that entrepreneurial turnover increases the 
firm size (measured either by capital or by the number of employees) by 33 percent at the 
median and by almost 45 percent at the mean. 
Not  surprisingly,  initial  size  and  patenting  activity  in  the  US  are  strong 
independent predictors of larger size at survey time (the latter especially so with regard to 
raised  capital).    Among  other  controls  (not  shown),  founding  year  dummies  and  main 
activity area dummies are jointly highly statistically significant, but startup background 
variables  are  jointly  statistically  insignificant.    CEO  background  characteristics,  on  the 
other hand, are jointly statistically significant at 5 percent level in both regressions. 
  Finally in Table 6 we look at the stages of the IPO process as a measure of a 
startup’s success in bringing high value for its shareholders.    The respondents to the 2008 
survey were asked to answer the question about their IPO event or intention.    The four 
possible answers were (i) “has already conducted IPO”, (ii) “intend to conduct at IPO at a 
specific date and market” (specifying the date and the market), (iii) “consider IPO but no 
specific  plans  at  the  moment”,  and  (iv)  “have  no  IPO  plans”.    Before  presenting  the   33 
regression results, the top part of Table 6 shows the summary statistics.    Firms managed 
by non-founders are more likely to have already conducted IPO or to have specific plans to 
conduct IPO than firms managed by founders, and they are also less likely to have no 
intention of conducting IPO at all.    The statistical power of the mean comparison t-test is 
limited because of limited number of observations, but with regard to having no intention 
of IPO the one-sided test is statistically significant at 5 percent level and the two-sided test 
is  significant  at  10  percent  level  (in  the  two  other  cases  only  the  one-sided  test  is 
statistically significant at 10 percent level). 
The bottom part of Table 6 presents the results of estimating an ordered probit 
regression  where  the  four  answers  above  are  classified  as  four  different  stages  of  IPO 
process, with (i) being the highest and (iv) the lowest stage.    Both with and without extra 
controls for changes in core technology, patenting activity in the US, log initial capital and 
venture  capital  financing,  the  non-founder  entrepreneur  dummy  is  positively  and 
statistically significantly (at 5 percent level) associated with the startup being further along 
its way to conducting an IPO.    Areas of activity are jointly statistically significant at 1 
percent level, but founding year dummies are jointly statistically insignificant.    Among 
other controls, US patenting activity dummy and venture capital financing are predictably 
strongly positively associated with IPO, but including these controls does not affect the 
coefficient on entrepreneurial turnover (if anything, it makes it even somewhat larger).   34 
5. Conclusions and discussion 
We  have  presented  a  model  where  science-based  businesses  started  by  academic 
researchers  with  relatively  low  entrepreneurial  ability  may  be  taken  to  the 
commercialization stage by high-ability entrepreneurs who do not have a project (seed) of 
their  own.    An  equilibrium  exists  where  such  entrepreneurial  turnover  coexists  with 
startups that are continuously managed by their academic founders.    The theory predicts 
that  the  startups  that  experience  entrepreneurial  turnover  will  tend  to  outperform  the 
startups that are managed by their founders in terms of R&D expenditure, firm size and 
ultimate success rates (such as IPO events), with capital raised but not R&D expenditure 
also influenced by how long the new entrepreneur had been in charge. 
Startups  that  are  developed  by  high-ability  entrepreneurs  invest  to  learn  the 
quality of their seed and discard useless seeds.    This insight is somewhat similar to the 
“cash-out or flame-out” idea explored by Arora and Nandkumar [2009].    But in our model 
it is not just entrepreneurs with the highest opportunity cost who choose the investment 
option, but entrepreneurs with the lowest opportunity cost also do the same, in anticipation 
of hiring high-ability entrepreneurs to develop their seed if it turns out to be good. 
The basic framework of the model is closely related to the ideas first explored in 
Jovanovic and Braguinsky [2004].    In that paper we assumed, however, that projects were 
traded in the market, and not entrepreneurial talent.    It should be emphasized that all what 
really matters is the idea that good seeds are matched with high-ability entrepreneurs, and   35 
this can equally happen through seeds changing hands if the market for seeds were to 
replace  the  market  for  entrepreneurs  in  our  model,  without  changing  the  nature  of  the 
equilibrium in Section 3.    Our decision to adopt the market for entrepreneurs rather than 
the market for seeds for the purposes of this paper was driven partly by theory and partly by 
empirical considerations.    From a theoretical perspective, we agree with the concept (e.g., 
in  Zingales  [2000])  that  while  projects  may  indeed  more  easily  change  hands  than 
management  teams  in  traditional  types  of  business,  in  science-based  business  the  tacit 
knowledge  of  the  founder  might  be  essential  also  at  the  development  stage,  making  it 
difficult to move the seed.    And on the empirical side, our data indicate that even though 
entrepreneurial turnover is quite common, the controlling stake in the firm for most part is 
retained by the founder despite the change in the CEO (Honjo et al. [2009]). 
When tested against the data on a representative sample of biotechnology startups 
in  Japan,  the  main  predictions  of  the  theory  are  strongly  supported.    Both  theory  and 
empirical  findings  supporting  it  indicate  that  at  the  stage  of  commercialization, 
science-based businesses may after all be subject to many of the same kind of regularities 
as  non  science-based  businesses,  so  that  the  emergence  of  biotechnology  and  other 
science-based  industries  in  the  past  couple  of  decades  does  not  necessarily  require 
drastically changing the established theory of the firm. 
Our study leads to important policy and managerial implications.    In terms of 
policy,  establishing  a  smoothly  functioning  market  for  entrepreneurial  talent,  including   36 
lowering the costs of investing into learning the commercial potential of a basic research 
seed and reducing incentives for academic researchers to hold on to their seeds for too long, 
may be at least as important as supporting the basic research to produce such seeds in the 
first place.    Our findings also imply that science-based businesses should be proactively 
seeking experienced managers if they want to evaluate and develop their seeds with a view 
to  generating  high  returns.    Zingales  [2000]  was  right  when  he  conjectured  that  firms 
organized around high-level human capital might well be unstable and dysfunctional.    In 
contrast to his view, however, our theory and evidence show that such an outcome is not 
inevitable. 
The nature of science-based business and its implications for the theory of the 
firm and industrial organization have been the subject of a hot debate in the literature.   
Our  paper  does  not  aim  to  resolve  this  debate  once  and  for  all.    But  it  suggests  that 
“traditional” theories of markets and firm can be fruitfully applied to understanding and 
analyzing science-based businesses just as they have been applied to more conventional 
types of businesses and industries. 
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Figure 1. Equilibrium behavior by startup type 
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λ = 0.15, C = 2, 
€ 
β = 0.95, xmax = 40, q = 25. 
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λ = 0.15, C = 0.5, 
€ 
β = 0.7, xmax = 40, q = 25. 
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Table 1. Some summary statistics 
Fraction founded: 
Before 1990  7.54 
1990-1999  20.70 
2000-2007  71.75 
Fraction with: 
Startup technology from basic research  52.94 
Seed turnover  27.98 
Entrepreneurial turnover  37.07 
Mean  10.35 
Firm age (years)  Standard Deviation  9.19 
Mean  4.33 
Years since CEO change (if any)  Standard Deviation  3.92 
Mean    1,911.3   
R&D expenditure (mln. yen)  Standard Deviation    7,336.7   
Mean    3,580.8   
Amount of capital raised (mln. yen)  Standard Deviation    9,872.7   
Mean  18.0 
Number of employees  Standard Deviation  26.6   44 
Table 2. Testing EP1 
Cohorts of entry  Before 1990  1990-1999  2000-2004  2005-2009 
Number of startups  43  118  276  133 
Fraction in total  7.54  20.70  48.42  23.33 
•  Startups with founder CEOs at the time of survey 
      Fraction with startup 
technology from basic research  23.08  32.08  51.22  73.20 
Fraction with CEOs 
   Former scientists  26.67  47.37  51.47  57.55 
   Formerly employed in: 
      Academia  6.25  12.28  21.13  37.38 
      Large corporations  18.75  54.39  38.73  30.84 
      Other non-academia  75.00  33.33  40.14  31.78 
•  Startups with non-founder CEOs at the time of survey 
      Fraction with startup 
technology from basic research  26.32  37.78  61.96  62.50 
Fraction with CEOs 
   Former scientists  52.63  47.83  35.85  25.00 
   Formerly employed in: 
      Academia  0.00  24.44  17.31  5.88 
      Large corporations  45.00  48.89  49.04  58.82 
      Other non-academia  55.00  26.67  33.65  35.29 
Note: Academia includes universities and public research corporations. 
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  Table 3. Estimations of regression (13) 
Dependent variable 
Log paid capital   
in founding year 
Log number of employees in 
founding year 
Coefficient  0.719  ***  0.629  ***  0.381  ***  0.405  ***  Non-founder 
CEO  St. Error  0.331     0.177     0.118     0.125    
Coefficient        -0.678  ***        -0.191     Basic research 
core technology  St. Error        0.186           0.123    
Coefficient        -0.637  *        0.410  *  Diversifying 
entrant  St. Error        0.355           0.213    
Coefficient        0.582  ***        0.207  *  US patent 
activity dummy  St. Error        0.218           0.118    
Coefficient  0.992     0.430     0.875  ***  0.826  *** 














Number of observations  403  366  379  347 
Number of firms  275  262  260  248 
Adjusted R-squared  0.094  0.186  0.110  0.147 
Note: *** indicates that the coefficient is significant at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, 
and  *  at  10  percent  level.  Robust  clustered  standard  errors.  Other  controls  (not 
shown) in columns 2 and 4 include CEO prior job and prior occupation dummies, 
CEO’s education dummies, seven area of activity dummies and 48 founding year 
dummies.   46 
Table 4. Estimations of regression (14) 
Dependent variable  Log R&D expenditure in survey year 
Coefficient  0.714  *  0.750  ***  0.731  ***  0.475  ** 
Non-founder CEO  St. Error  0.375     0.217     0.242     0.212    
Coefficient  -0.006    
CEO tenure  St. Error  0.032     Excluded  Excluded  Excluded 
Coefficient  0.000     Non-founder CEO 
inter. w/tenure  St. Error  0.047     Excluded  Excluded  Excluded 
Coefficient  0.102  **  0.095  ***  0.058  *  0.004    
Firm age  St. Error  0.043     0.027     0.031     0.029    
Coefficient  -0.002  **  -0.002  ***  -0.001  *  -0.001    
Firm age squared  St. Error  0.001     0.001     0.001     0.000    
Coefficient              1.021  ***  0.848  ***  US patent activity 
dummy  St. Error              0.236     0.229    
Coefficient                    0.734  ***  Log number of 
employees  St. Error                    0.104    
Coefficient  1.861  ***  1.858  ***  2.010  ***  0.874  * 










Number of observations  298  298  276  273 
Number of firms  211  211  201  198 
Adjusted R-squared  0.269  0.274  0.355  0.479 
Notes: *** indicates that the coefficient is significant at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent 
level,  and  *  at  10  percent  level.  Robust  clustered  standard  errors.  Other  controls  (not 
shown) in columns 2 and 4 include CEO prior job and prior occupation dummies, CEO’s 
education dummies, dummy equal to 1 if entrant from a related industry and zero otherwise, 
and  dummy  equal  to  1  if  the  startup  technology  came  from  basic  research  and  zero 
otherwise.   47 
Table 5. Estimations of regression (15) 
Dependent variable 
Log paid capital in 
survey year 
Log # of employees in 
survey year 
Coefficient  -0.005     -0.297   
Non-founder CEO  St. Error  0.422     0.268    
Coefficient  0.042     -0.022    
CEO tenure  St. Error  0.047     0.023    
Coefficient  0.108  *  0.108  **  Non-founder CEO inter. 
w/tenure  St. Error  0.063     0.043    
Coefficient  -0.057     0.063    Change in core technology 
since founding  St. Error  0.195     0.137    
Coefficient  0.762  ***  0.217  * 
US patent dummy  St. Error  0.207     0.113    
Coefficient  0.287  ***  0.307  ***  Log initial paid capital (# 
of employees)  St. Error  0.102     0.105    
Coefficient  0.941     0.972  *** 
Constant  St. Error  0.712     0.308    
Other controls 
Activity areas, CEO and startup background 
dummies, 48 founding year dummies 
Number of observations  361  339 
Number of firms  259  243 
Adjusted R-squared  0.426  0.373 
Notes: *** indicates that the coefficient is significant at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent 
level,  and  *  at  10  percent  level.  Robust  clustered  standard  errors.  Other  controls  (not 
shown) include 48 founding year dummies, seven areas of main activity dummies, CEO 
prior job and prior occupation dummies, CEO’s education dummies, dummy equal to 1 if 
entrant from a related industry and zero otherwise, and dummy equal to 1 if the startup 
technology came from basic research and zero otherwise. 
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Table 6. Effect on stages of IPO 
Firms managed by:  Non-founder    Founder    t-test (mean comparison) 
Stages of IPO:  Fractions  One-sided  Two-sided 
Have conducted IPO  0.064  0.024  0.081  0.162 
Have specific IPO plan  0.096  0.049  0.090  0.180 
No IPO intention  0.383  0.500  0.966  0.068 
Number of observations  94  164       
Dependent variable  IPO stage (ordered probit) 
Coefficient  0.420  **  0.488  ** 
Non-founder CEO  St. Error  0.192     0.222    
Coefficient        -0.299     Core technology 
changed since founded  St. Error        0.218    
Coefficient        0.523  **  US patenting activity 
dummy  St. Error        0.216    
Coefficient        -0.027    
Log initial paid capital  St. Error        0.078    
Coefficient        1.097  *** 
VC financing dummy  St. Error        0.219    
Other controls  Area of activity and 48 founding year dummies 
Number of observations (firms)  221     200    
Pseudo R-squared  0.168     0.269    
Notes: P-values in mean comparison t-test with unequal variance. ** indicates that the 
coefficient is significant at 5 percent level. “IPO stage” refers to four answer categories as 
described in the main text. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
The  proof  proceeds  by  construction.    To  begin  with,  notice  that  for  q  close  to  0  the 
left-hand  side  of  (11)  tends  to  zero,  while  the  right-hand  side  tends  to 
€ 
1− λ ( ) 1− F C λ 1−βλ ( ) ( ) [ ] > 0 ,  since 
€ 
xmax > C 1−βλ ( )   by  assumption.    Also  the 
left-hand side of (11) is strictly increasing in q, while the right-hand side is decreasing in q.   
There are two possible cases. 
---  Case  (i).    There  is  some 
€ 
ˆ  q < C λ 1−β ( )  such  that  (11)  is  satisfied  with  equality  at 
€ 
q = ˆ  q .    Conditions (10) and (11) yield, after some manipulations, that    at such 
a 
€ 
ˆ  q  .    Then (9) says that the number of entrepreneurs from the top region moving to 
work  with  seeds  owned  by  the  startups  with  z  =  1  in  the  bottom  region  is 
€ 
λF ˜  x  ( ) = 1− λ ( ) 1− F ˆ  x  ( ) [ ].    Together  with  (10)  this  implies  that  (11)  is  indeed  the 
desired equilibrium.   
--- Case (ii).    Assume now that at 
€ 
q = C λ 1−β ( )  there is still excess supply of seedless 
entrepreneurs (the left-hand side of (11) is smaller than the right-hand side).    This 
means  that  q  has  to  increase  further.    But  if 
€ 
q > C λ 1−β ( ),  the  no-investment 
option becomes less attractive than paying C and letting another entrepreneur develop 
the seed if z = 1 for founder  , so that only the bottom region 
€ 
x ∈ 0, ˆ  x  [ )  and the top 
region    remain as part of an equilibrium (notice that    if and only 
if 
€ 
q ≥ C λ 1−β ( )).   T he  number  of  entrepreneurs  from  the  top  region  moving  to 
work  with  seeds  owned  by  the  startups  with  z  =  1  in  the  bottom  region  is 
€ 
λF ˆ  x  ( ) = 1− λ ( ) 1− F ˆ  x  ( ) [ ],  while  founder 
€ 
ˆ  x   is  indifferent  between  paying  C  and 
receiving q with probability 
€ 
λ, on the one hand, and choosing the investment option 
with the expected private value EI as in (2), on the other hand.    Hence, we must have 
€ 
λq−C = ˆ  x −C − 1− λ ( )q ⇒ ˆ  x = q, so that if equilibrium exists, (12) must be satisfied.   
But since the left-hand side in (12) tends to 1 as q becomes high, while the right-hand 
side tends to zero (because xmax is finite), an equilibrium will always exist. 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
To be completed. 